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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The interest in the study of the relationship between product market competition (PMC, 
henceforth), innovation and growth has always been at the core of economists’ research agenda. 
Schumpeter (1942) was among the first to recognize the need to provide the successful innovator 
with some form of monopoly power in order to stimulate investment in research and development 
(R&D) activity and, thus economic growth. The idea that innovation and growth should increase 
with market power can be found not only in the IO literature (for example, Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 
1980; Caballero and Jaffe, 1993), but also in the first generation of Schumpeterian growth 
models (namely, Aghion and Howitt, 1992). However, empirical work has never completely 
corroborated such a theoretical prediction. 
Indeed, although it is only in the sixties that the Schumpeterian hypothesis (negative 
relationship between competition and innovation) starts being empirically tested, thanks to the 
pioneering works of Scherer (1965; 1967),1 these papers, and more recently those by Geroski 
(1994), Nickell (1996) and Blundell et al. (1999), point to a positive correlation between 
competition, innovative output and growth, even though they do not uncover the possible 
reason(s) why competition may be growth-enhancing. 
Scott (1984) and Levin et al. (1985) were the first to find out an inverted-U relationship 
between R&D intensity and market concentration, with a peak at a 4-firm concentration ratio of 
around 50% to 65%, when not controlling for industry characteristics. A similar result (bell-
shaped relationship between PMC and innovation) is also present in Aghion et al. (2005), 
analyzing a range of industries drawn from a firm panel for the UK. The data concern UK listed 
firms over the period 1968-1996. In this paper, PMC is measured by one minus the Lerner index 
(ratio of operating profits minus financial costs over sales), controlling for capital depreciation, 
advertising expenditures, and firm size. The long time series on firms in each industry allows the 
authors to control for industry level effects as well as common time effects. The inverted-U 
relationship between PMC and innovation is found to be robust to many alternative specifications 
and remains true in the data for many individual industries. 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive survey of empirical literature on the relationship between market structure and innovation see 
Cohen and Levin (1989), Scherer (1992), Cohen (1995), Symeonidis (1996) and Ahn (2002). For a review of the 
theoretical contributions to this research topic over the last twenty years, see Van Cayseele (1998). 
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In sum, there exists (past and present) micro-evidence showing that the relationship between 
competition and growth is positive or, at most, inverse U-shaped. This finding is clearly at odds 
with the basic Schumpeterian growth paradigm. For this reason, such a paradigm has been 
recently re-formulated and extended along many directions.2 A first strand of the literature 
(Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey, 1997; 1999) has emphasized the importance of agency issues: 
intensified PMC  can force managers to speed up the adoption of new technologies in order to 
avoid loss of control rights due to bankruptcy. This effect of PMC  causes, then, higher economic 
growth rates in the future.3 An alternative approach, introduced by Aghion and Howitt (1996), 
has shown that more competition between new and old production lines (parameterized by 
increased substitutability between them) can make skilled workers more adaptable in switching 
to newer ones. Holding the fixed supply of skilled workers constant, this in turn leads to an 
increase in the initial flow of workers into newly discovered products, which enhances the 
profitability of research (and, hence, economic growth) by reducing the cost of implementing a 
successful innovation. Still, the two works cited so far would predict a monotonic relationship 
between PMC and growth. This is not the case of Aghion, Harris and Vickers (1997) and Aghion 
et al. (2001) that extend the basic Schumpeterian model with creative destruction by allowing 
incumbent firms to innovate. In these papers, when PMC (as measured by either a greater 
elasticity of demand or as a switch from Cournot to Bertrand rivalry) is low, an increase will 
raise innovation through the “escape competition effect” on neck-and-neck firms, but when it 
becomes intense enough it may lower innovation through the traditional “Schumpeterian effect” 
on laggards. The contraposition of these two effects makes the relationship between competition 
and growth inverse-U shaped.4 
With respect to the literature mentioned thus far, the aim of the present paper is to analyze to 
which extent an inverted-U relationship between competition and growth may take place in the 
case in which innovation-based growth is a process generating new varieties of horizontally-
differentiated products, rather than quality-improved new products. In this respect, we keep the 
                                                 
2 See Aghion and Griffith (2005), Aghion and Howitt (1998a, Chap. 7; 1998b; 2005); Aghion et al. (2005) and 
Bucci (2003) for surveys on this theoretical literature. 
3 Indeed, the authors show that the relationship between PMC and innovation is always negative if most firms are 
profit-maximizing, whereas it is always positive if most firms are governed by “satisficing” managers who mainly 
care about the firm remaining in activity. 
 3
canonical hypothesis that there exists an aggregate R&D sector that produces ideas for the whole 
economy and assume that innovation increases the total stock of society’s knowledge. Moreover, 
we completely abstract from any form of strategic interaction among rivals (on both goods and 
factors markets). 
While continuing to measure PMC by one minus the Lerner index, the originality of our 
contribution consists in the fact that this measure of competition is the result of the interaction 
between two additional variables determining, respectively, the elasticity of substitution across 
(intermediate) goods and the share of factor inputs in total income. Using a technology for the 
final goods sector similar to Jones and Williams (2000), we show that results concerning the 
shape of the relationship between PMC and growth may change dramatically. 
Romer (1990) was the first to study extensively the consequences for aggregate economic 
growth of horizontal product innovation, but the analysis of the relationship between competition 
and growth was not at the core of his paper. Two further differences characterize our work with 
respect to Romer’s (1990). The first is that we restrict our attention to the case of an economy 
where a fixed supply input (labor, in our case) can be employed simultaneously in each economic 
activity. The other difference is that our model does not display any scale effect (the prediction 
according to which larger economies should exhibit a higher real per-capita income growth rate). 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In section 2 we set the model. In section 
3 we examine its balanced-growth path (BGP) equilibrium  properties. Sections 4 and 5 contain 
the main results of the paper. In Section 4 we introduce and discuss our measure of competition 
in the goods market and analyze the link between PMC and economic growth. We show that, if 
competition is proxied by the share of intermediate inputs in total income, then the relationship 
between PMC and growth may well be inverse-U shaped. On the other hand, this relationship 
becomes U-shaped when we proxy competition by the parameter that determines the elasticity of 
substitution across intermediate goods. We explain such a difference in our results through the 
interplay between two effects (the resource allocation and the profit incentive effects). Finally, 
section 5 concludes. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
4 In an alternative setting, Smulders and van de Klundert (1995) and van de Klundert and Smulders (1997) analyze 
the link between competition and growth under the assumption that high-tech firms can rely on in-house skills in 
producing innovations and that knowledge spillovers across firms in the R&D activity may occur. 
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2.  THE MODEL 
 
Consider an economy where three sectors of activity are vertically integrated. In the research 
sector, firms use labor together with knowledge capital to engage in innovation activity. 
Innovation consists in discovering new blueprints for firms operating in the capital goods sector. 
The number of blueprints existing at a certain point in time coincides with the number of 
intermediate input varieties and represents the actual stock of non-rival knowledge capital 
available in the economy. The intermediate goods sector is composed of monopolistically 
competitive firms, each producing a differentiated variety j. To enter the intermediate sector a 
firm must acquire a patent. By purchasing a patent a firm obtains a perpetual monopoly power 
over the sale of a specialized intermediate. Unlike Romer (1990), and following Grossman and 
Helpman (1991, Ch. 3), we assume that the production of one unit of intermediates requires one 
unit of labor, irrespective of its own variety.5 In the final output sector, firms produce a 
homogeneous consumption good by employing labor and the available set of intermediate inputs.  
 
 
2.1  Producers 
In the final output sector atomistic producers engage in perfect competition. Following Spence 
(1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Ethier (1982) and Jones and Williams (2000), we postulate that 
the technology to produce the homogeneous consumption good (Y) is given by: 
( )
η
ηαα
/1
0
1)( ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
= ∫− tN jtYtt djxLY ,    10 << α ,    αηα 11 10 <<+< .       (1) 
 According to this technology, at any time period t final output ( tY , the numeraire good) is 
obtained by combining with constant returns to scale labor ( YtL ) and N different varieties of 
intermediate inputs, each of which is employed in the quantity jx . In a symmetric equilibrium 
where the total production of intermediates is evenly spread across the N brands, α  measures the 
share of total output going to capital goods (ShK). Instead, ( α−1 ) is the share of output accruing 
                                                 
5 In Romer (1990) it is assumed that the variable input in the intermediate goods production is physical capital 
(foregone consumption) and not labor. Hence, in that model the economy has two state variables (i.e. physical and 
knowledge capital).  
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to labor (ShL). Finally, η  is a parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution between 
intermediate inputs, equal to: 
( )ShLe −−= 11
1
η
,   α−≡1ShL . 
In Romer (1990), η  equals one implying that the elasticity of substitution depends on the 
inverse of the labor share in income (ShL). In the more general case of 1≠η , the restriction 
αηα /1)1/(10 <<+<  ensures simultaneously that intermediate inputs are imperfectly 
substitutable in production (e>1) and that (as we are going to show in a moment) the demand 
curve for intermediate good j slopes downward, the markup on intermediate goods is greater than 
unity and the instantaneous profit accruing at t to the j-th capital good producer in a symmetric 
equilibrium is inversely related to the number of varieties existing at that date.  
 
As the industry is competitive, in equilibrium each input receives its own marginal product (in 
terms of the numeraire good):  
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
11
0
1 −
−
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
= ∫ ηαηηααα jtN jtYtjt xdjxLp t ;                 (2) 
( )
Yt
t
Yt L
Y
w α−= 1 .                         (3) 
 In equations (2) and (3), pjt  and Ytw  represent, respectively, the inverse demand function 
faced at time t by the generic j-th intermediate producer and the labor demand coming from final 
output firms. 
In the intermediate sector producers of capital goods engage in monopolistic competition. 
Each firm produces one (and only one) horizontally differentiated intermediate and must 
purchase a patented design before producing its own specialized durable. Thus, the price of the 
patent represents a fixed entry cost. We assume that each local intermediate monopolist has 
access to the same one-to-one technology, employing labor ( jl ) only: 
  
jtjt lx =  ,   [ ]tNj ,0∈∀ ,   with [ )∞∈ ,0tN .              (4) 
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For given N, equation (4) implies that the total amount of labor demanded by the intermediate 
sector at time t ( jtL ) is: 
∫ ∫ ≡=t tN N jtjtjt Ldjldjx
0 0
.                          (4’) 
The firm producing the j-th variety, after bearing the expenses related to the purchase of the j-
th idea, maximizes at each point in time its own instantaneous profit with respect to jtx  and 
subject to the demand constraint (2). Under the assumption that in the intermediate sector the 
number of firms is so large that each of them is unconstrained by competitors offering an 
equivalent product,6 the resolution of this maximization program gives the optimal price set by 
the generic j-th intermediate producer for one unit of its own output: 
tjttjt mwmwpp === ,   [ ]tNj ,0∈∀ ,   ( ) ηαη
1
1
1
=
−
≡
ShL
m .         (5) 
Thus, the markup over the marginal cost (m) is a negative function of the elasticity of 
substitution between intermediate inputs (e) and is constant. The marginal cost is represented by 
the wage rate accruing to labor employed in the intermediate sector ( jw ). Due to the hypothesis 
that labor is a homogeneous factor input and perfectly mobile across sectors, in equilibrium such 
wage rate will be the same (w) for each economic activity where labor is employed.  
When 1=η  (Romer, 1990) the monopoly markup chosen by intermediate firms depends only 
on the factor input shares in income ( ShLShK −=≡ 1α ). Instead, when 1≠η , using the 
aggregate technology of equation (1) has the advantage of severing the overly restrictive link 
between the markup and the factor input shares (see Jones and Williams, 2000, p. 68), since in 
this case the markup depends also on the parameter of substitution η . 
Under the assumption of symmetry (i.e., x and, then, p are equal for each j), it is 
straightforward to derive the following results: 
jttt LxN =   ⇒   
t
jt
t N
L
x = ;                         (4”)  
                                                 
6 This amounts to assuming that each intermediate goods firm acts as local monopolist. Formally, 
0)(
0
=
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
∂ ∫t
N
jt
jt
djx
x
ηα . 
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( ) ( ) ( ) t
t
t
tjtYtjt N
Y
m
NLL
m
πααπ η
αη
αα
=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−=
+−
−
1111
)1(11    [ ]tNj ,0∈∀ .      (6) 
 
In words, in a symmetric equilibrium each firm producing intermediates will decide at time t 
to produce the same quantity of output ( tx ), to sell it at the same price ( tp ), accruing the same 
instantaneous profit rate )( tπ . This result follows from the symmetry of the production 
technology across intermediate firms (equation 4). As we are dealing with a monopolistic 
competition sector, the profit has to be decreasing in the number of intermediate producers (N). 
This leads to the restriction )1/(1 αη +>  that we have explicitly reported in equation (1). 
 Plugging equation (2) into equation (5), and using the symmetric equilibrium hypothesis, 
yields the wage rate accruing to one unit of labor employed in the intermediate sector ( jtw ): 
jt
t
jt L
Y
m
w α= .                                   (5’)  
  
 
2.2  R&D Sector 
There are many competitive research firms undertaking R&D. These firms produce designs 
indexed by 0 through an upper bound 0≥N . Thus, tN  measures the total stock of society’s 
knowledge at time t. Designs are patented and partially excludable, but non-rival and 
indispensable for capital goods production. With access to the available stock of knowledge tN , 
research firms use labor and develop new blueprints according to the following constant returns 
to scale R&D technology: 
t
t
Nt
t N
LN
χ
=
•
,  tt kL≡χ ,  0>k ,                  (7) 
where NL  denotes the aggregate employment in research, χ  is an index that measures the 
difficulty of performing R&D activity and k is a parameter. 
The χ  term in the right-hand side of equation (7) has been introduced first by Dinopoulos and 
Segerstrom (1999) and captures in a very simple way the idea that R&D difficulty grows with the 
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size of the market.7 The so-called dilution effect is at the hearth of equation (7). According to this 
effect, inventing a new intermediate design requires a labor input equal to tt N/χ , which changes 
over time because of both innovation and population growth. While innovation generates a 
positive inter-temporal externality, the population growth tends to reduce innovation via a fall in 
the R&D productivity. The hypothesis that research labor productivity increases with the stock of 
knowledge ( tN ) can be justified by the idea that researchers benefit from accessing to the 
available total stock of applications for patents, obtaining inspiration to generate new designs 
(see Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Ch. 3; Gancia and Zilibotti, 2005).8  The hypothesis that 
research labor productivity falls with the level of R&D difficulty ( χ ), instead, can be justified  
by the idea that it is harder to introduce successfully new varieties and replace older ones when 
markets are very crowded (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 1999). 
By defining the growth rate in the number of varieties (i.e. the rate of innovation) at time t by 
Ntg , yields: 
k
s
N
Ng Nt
t
t
Nt =≡
•
,   
t
Nt
Nt L
Ls ≡ . 
 Since the research sector is perfectly competitive, the price of the j-th design at time t is equal 
to the discounted value of the flow of instantaneous profits that it is possible to make in the 
intermediate sector (to which the design is licensed) by the j-th intermediate firm from t onwards: 
( ) ( )∫∫ ∞ −−∞ −− ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −==
t
tr
t
tr
Nt deN
Y
m
deP τατπ τ
τ
ττ
τ
11 ,      τ > t .          (8) 
In this expression, NP  is the price of the generic j-th blueprint (the one that allows producing 
the j-th variety of capital goods), π  is the profit of the j-th intermediate firm and r is the real 
interest rate. The fact that in equation (8) an infinite horizon is explicitly considered depends on 
                                                 
7  The addition of this variable stems from the Jones (1995) criticism of the scale effect, according to which in the 
basic Schumpeterian growth literature the steady-state growth rate of the economy tends to explode in the presence 
of growing population. For a deeper discussion of this issue see, among others, the surveys by Dinopoulos and 
Thompson (1999), Dinopoulos and Sener (2006) and Jones (2005). 
8 The measurement of R&D spillovers has proved to be quite difficult and particularly controversial in the literature. 
See Griliches (1992) and Klette et al. (2000) for reviews of this evidence. Griliches (1992) concludes that R&D 
spillovers are not only present, but also their magnitude may be quite large, and social rates of return remain 
significantly above private rates. This conclusion is supported by Nadiri (1993), whose summary of the existing 
evidence points to the social rates of return to R&D varying from 20% to over 100%. 
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the hypothesis that, once obtained a new blueprint from the R&D sector, the generic j-th producer 
of capital goods can accrue forever the monopoly profits deriving from the new variety being 
produced. This is a peculiarity of horizontal differentiation growth models. It is also easy to see 
that for NtP  to be positive the restriction αη /1<  must be checked (see equation 1 above). Free-
entry into R&D sector implies: 
Nt
t
t
Nt wN
P χ= ,                           (9) 
 
where Nw  is the wage rate accruing to one unit of labor employed in the research sector. 
Equation (9) states that the entry of new firms into the sector will continue until the price that one 
obtains from the sale of an additional blueprint equals the production marginal cost.  
The description of the preferences closes the model. 
 
 
2.3 Consumers 
 
The economy is populated by infinitely-lived agents who derive utility from consumption of 
final goods and supply labor inelastically. Population (L) grows at the exogenous rate n>0 and is 
(fully) employed either in manufacturing or R&D. Total output ( tY ) can be only consumed. 
Hence, denoting by tC  total consumption at time t, we have tt CY = . Each member of the 
population is endowed with a fixed amount of labor that s/he allocates to either production 
(homogeneous final goods and intermediate inputs) or research activities. By normalizing to 
unity the supply of labor of each individual in the economy, the total labor supply available at 
time t is tL . The representative consumer of this economy also owns assets (a) in the form of 
ownership claims on firms and maximizes, under constraint, the discounted value of his/her 
lifetime utility: 
{ }
( )
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
−+=
=
•
∞
−∫∞
=
ttttt
t
t
c
carwa
ts
dtceUMax
tt
:..
log
0
0
0
ρ
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The first order conditions of this problem must satisfy the constraint on a, together with the 
transversality condition: 
0lim =
∞→
ttt
aλ . 
Symbols have the following meaning: U0  and ( )tclog  are, respectively, the inter-temporal and 
instantaneous utility functions of the representative agent;9 c denotes per-capita consumption 
( ttt LCc /≡ ); ρ  is the agent’s subjective time preference rate; w  and ra  are his/her labor and 
interest incomes and tλ  is the co-state variable.  
The solution to the problem above yields a standard Euler equation: 
ρ−=
•
t
t
t r
c
c . 
Since total output can be only consumed, and given our definition of per-capita consumption, 
the equation above leads to: 
( )nrg
Y
Y
C
C
tYt
t
t
t
t
−−=≡=
••
ρ ,    n>ρ .10                  (10) 
In the model savings are used to finance innovative investments. Moreover, in the BGP 
equilibrium, when the growth rate of output ( Yg ) is constant, r turns out to be constant as well. 
 
 
 
3.  BGP EQUILIBRIUM 
  
Before characterizing the BGP equilibrium of the model presented so far, we first introduce a 
formal definition of it. 
  
Definition: A BGP equilibrium is an equilibrium where: (i) The growth rate of all variables 
depending on time is constant; (ii) The demand for labor coming from each sector ( YL , jL  and 
NL ) grows at the same rate as the total supply of labor (L). 
 
                                                 
9 Following Grossman and Helpman (1991) we assume that the instantaneous utility function is logarithmic. Using 
more general isoelastic functions does not alter the results. 
10 This condition guarantees that the inter-temporal utility function of the representative household does not explode. 
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In order to determine the optimal allocation of the given supply of labor ( tL ) across the three 
sectors using this factor input, we equalize the sectoral wage rates accrued by one unit of labor 
(this is a homogeneous input and perfectly mobile across sectors and, then, it must be 
compensated according to a unique wage rate). As a result, the following three conditions must 
be simultaneously checked: 
1=++ NtYtjt sss , ∀t ;                        (11) 
jtYt ww =                               (12) 
NtYt ww = ,                              (13) 
where jts , Yts  and Nts  represent the shares of the total labor supply devoted, respectively, to 
intermediate and consumption goods production and to research activity. 
Equation (11) is the labor market clearing condition, saying that at any point in time total 
labor demand (the left hand side) must be equal to total labor supply (the right hand side). 
Equations (12) and (13) together state that the wage earned by one unit of labor is to be the same 
irrespective of the sector where that unit of labor is actually employed.  
The simultaneous resolution of the equations system (11) through (13) yields the following 
BGP equilibrium values for the relevant endogenous variables of the model (see the Appendix 
for analytical details): 
 
( ) ( )( )11 2 +−−−−= αηαρηαα nksN ;                        (14) 
( ) ( )[ ]nksY −+−= ρα 11 ;                                (15)  
( )[ ]nks j −+= ρηα 12 ;                              (16) 
( ) ( )( )11 2 +−−−−=≡
•
αηαρηαα n
kN
Ng
t
t
N ;                        (17) 
( ) ( )( )⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ +−−−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
+=≡
•
111 2 αηαρηαα
η
ηα n
k
n
Y
Yg
t
t
Y ;                   (18) 
( ) ( )( ) ραηαρηαα
η
ηα
+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+−−−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
= 111 2n
k
r .                        (19) 
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 Equations (14) through (16) give the (constant) shares of labor supply that are devoted to 
research, final output and intermediate sectors along the symmetric BGP equilibrium. Equations 
(17) through (19), instead, represent respectively the equilibrium innovation, output growth and 
real interest rates. Economic growth (18) does not display any scale effect and turns out to be a 
function, among others, of the parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution between 
intermediate inputs, η , and the labor share in income, 1-α . In the next section, we clarify what it 
means in terms of competition and discuss the main predictions of the model concerning the 
long-run relationship between PMC and growth. 
 
 
 
4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PMC AND GROWTH 
  
We now study the long-run relationship between competition and growth in the model 
presented above. But, before doing this, we first clarify what we mean by competition in the 
context we are analyzing. Because PMC  cannot be measured directly, we necessitate some proxy 
for this variable. The IO literature (both empirical and theoretical) generally uses the so-called 
Lerner index to gauge the intensity of market power within a market. Such index equals the ratio 
of price (P) minus marginal costs (MC) over price. Given the definition of markup (price to 
marginal costs), the Lerner index can be re-written as: 
Lerner index = (P-MC)/P = 1-1/m,   m = P/MC. 
From the last equation it is straightforward to conclude that: 
1-Lerner index = 1/m = αη . 
In the remainder of the paper we take (1-Lerner index) as a measure of the degree of 
competition in the intermediate sector.11 Observe that the markup is lower when the elasticity of 
substitution between each pair of intermediates is higher, that is when both η  and α  are 
higher.12 
                                                 
11 This is the same measure of competition used by Aghion et al. (2005). 
12 Koeniger and Licandro (2006) have recently cast some doubts on the use of the elasticity of substitution between 
goods as an indicator for PMC. Their argument hinges on the fact that a change in substitutability also implies a 
reallocation effect. Accordingly, the impact on growth of variations in the degree of competition is overstated when 
those variations are caught by changes in substitutability. However, their framework only provides a formal analysis 
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This having been said, PMC may play an important role in economic growth in two 
fundamental respects. First of all, it allows allocating the available resources to the best uses 
(resource allocation effect), while improving the performance of labor markets (Blanchard, 
2004). At the same time, and according to Schumpeterian growth theory, because it erodes 
monopoly rents, PMC is detrimental to innovation (profit incentive effect). Equations (8) and (9) 
can be used to highlight these two effects. A change in m, for given N and for given sectoral 
distribution of the labor input ( YL  and jL ),13 determines a variation in NP  and, thus, in the 
incentives for firms to perform R&D activity. This is the traditional profit incentive effect one 
may find in most of the R&D-based growth models. In addition, another effect needs to be 
considered. For given N, the original change in m determines also, through NP , a variation of the 
wage rate w (the same across sectors in equilibrium) for equation (9) to hold. The joint variation 
of m, NP  and w will induce some substitution between intermediate goods and labor in the final 
output sector and will give rise to a re-allocation of the entire available supply of the labor input 
in the economy (thereby influencing both NL  and the equilibrium growth rate). Due to the 
specific assumptions made (namely Dixit-Stiglitz technology in the downstream sector and no 
strategic interaction between intermediate firms), in the model of the previous sections these two 
effects of PMC on growth (respectively the resource allocation and the profit incentive effects) 
are closely related to each other, since more competition in the product market influences firms’ 
profits and incentives to innovate and, thus, modifies both the distribution of labor across 
economic activities and economic growth.  
The originality of this paper lies in the fact that the markup depends on two different 
components (see equation 5): the input shares in income ( ≡α ShK=1-ShL) and the parameter of 
substitution between intermediates (η ). In the rest of this section we show that results concerning 
the relationship between PMC and growth may dramatically change depending on which one of 
these two variables we use as a proxy of competition in the market for intermediates. At this aim 
we consider two different cases.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
for the case of static, price-setting oligopoly. In our paper we just rely on the case of monopolistic competition in a 
dynamic context. 
13 In a symmetric equilibrium the level of output is equal to: ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ηηααα /11 −−= tjtYtt NLLY . 
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CASE 1: 1=η . 
In the first case we set 1=η  (as in Romer, 1990) and study the BGP equilibrium relationship 
between α  and Yg . In this case the main variables of the model become: 
( ) ( )( )11 2 +−−−−= ααραα nksN ;                      (14’) 
( ) ( )[ ]nksY −+−= ρα 11 ;                           (15’) 
( )[ ]nks j −+= ρα 12 ;                         (16’) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ +−−−−−+=≡
•
111 2 ααρααα n
k
n
Y
Yg
t
t
Y .                                                                 (18’) 
 
Making the assumption of 1=η  has the implication that variations in the markup and 
variations in the factor input (labor and capital) income shares are strictly and univocally related 
to each other. However, this is not a novelty in recent economic theory literature. Following Hall 
(1988) and Galì (1995), other papers that measure the aggregate markup as a function of the input 
shares in income in monopolistic competition settings include Neiss (2001), Cavelaars (2003) 
and Przybyla and Roma (2005).14 Moreover, Galì and Gertler (1999) have used the labor share as 
a measure of marginal costs in New Keynesian Phillips curves.  
Our model predicts that changes in the factor shares over time and/or across countries should 
not only have a bearing on the markup, but, through this channel, also on economic growth (see 
18’ above). Accordingly, the question arises of whether those shares are really stable or not. In 
this respect, empirical evidence (Galì, 1995, pp.58-60 and, more recently, Bentolila and Saint-
Paul, 2003 and Jones, 2003) points to the presence of substantial differences both across 
countries and over time in the shares of labor and capital in income. As far as the labor share is 
concerned, Table 1 reports the medium-run movements in that share over a period of 20 years 
across 12 selected OECD countries. 
                                                 
14 Galì (1995), Neiss (2001), Cavelaars (2003) and Przybyla and Roma (2005) consider a two-sector framework in 
which the competitive consumption goods sector employs just differentiated intermediates, and labor is used only by 
capital goods firms operating in a monopolistically competitive sector. Simply by using the first order conditions for 
profit maximization of a representative uncompetitive firm, it is shown (see Galì, 1995, p.56; Neiss, 2001, p.574; 
Cavelaars, 2003, p.87) that the equilibrium markup is equal to the elasticity of output with respect to employment 
divided by the labor share in income. In the simplest case where the production function of intermediate goods is 
one-to-one in labor (so that the elasticity of output with respect to employment equals one), the markup turns out to 
be the inverse of the labor income share (see Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2001). This approach has been used to 
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The table suggests that the labor share is subject to large movements both cross-country and 
over time and that, contrary to economists’ conjecture, it is not constant. For instance, we see that 
in 1990 some countries (like Finland or Sweden) had labor shares around 72%, while others (like 
France, Germany or Italy) showed values around 62%.15 Moreover, we notice that over twenty 
years (1970-1990) there has not been any tendency of the labor share to converge across 
countries (the standard deviation has actually increased in the period analyzed). This is clear 
evidence that the labor share is definitely not constant. As for the capital share, Jones (2003) 
comes to a similar conclusion.16 
 
 
  Labor Share (in levels)  
 1970 1980 1990 Changes 
(1970-1990) 
United States 69.7 68.3 66.5 -3.2 
Canada 66.9 62.0 64.9 -2.0 
Japan 57.5 69.1 68.0 10.5 
Germany 64.1 68.7 62.1 -2.0 
France 67.6 71.7 62.4 -5.2 
Italy 67.1 64.0 62.6 -4.4 
Australia 64.8 65.9 62.9 -1.9 
Netherlands 68.0 69.5 59.2 -8.8 
Belgium 61.6 71.6 64.0 2.4 
Norway 68.4 66.4 63.9 -4.5 
Sweden 69.7 73.6 72.6 2.9 
Finland 68.6 69.6 72.3 3.7 
Mean 66.2 68.4 65.1 -1.1 
                                                                                                                                                              
construct time series for the economy-wide markup and to analyze, among other things, its cyclical behavior 
(Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999). 
15 Galì (1995), pp.58, reports that in 1985 many African countries had labor shares around or below 20% (19.8% for 
Benin; 19% for Burundi; 20.2% for Malawi; 17,6% for Niger; 21,9% for Nigeria; 18% for Sierra Leone and 14.1% 
for Tanzania). 
16 In particular, he concludes: “Overall, both the country-level and the industry-level evidence - in this paper and in 
other papers - sharply call into question the stylized fact that capital shares are smooth, stable, and do not exhibit 
medium-run trends. This fact is roughly true for some countries, but it is strongly contradicted in others. Even in the 
United States, a country typically used to justify the stylized fact, the industry-level evidence suggests there are 
substantial changes in capital shares over time” (Jones, 2003, pp.7-10 ).   
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Standard Deviation 3.6 3.3 4.1 0.5 
Table 1:  The labor share in 12 OECD countries over time (1970-1990). Source: Bentolila and Saint-Paul 
(2003). Note: All variables in percentage. The data reported by the table include an imputed labor 
remuneration for the self-employed on the basis of the average wage.17 The labor share 
corresponds to the business sector.18 
 
 
Turning back to our model, when we plot equation (18’) against the inverse of the markup 
( ShLShK −=≡ 1α ) we obtain the following Figure:  
 
         
Yg  
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
    PMC (α ) 
FIGURE 1:  The relationship between PMC  (α ) and growth ( Yg ) when 1=η  
 
 
In drawing Figure 1 we used the following parameter values: k=1, n=0.014419 and ρ =0.07.20 
Figure 1 suggests that there exists a bell-shaped relationship between competition and growth 
                                                 
17 Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa (2005) compute the labor share for 16 OECD countries over the period 1960-96 as 
the ratio between “compensation per employees and GDP” without including the self-employed workers. On 
average they obtain that the labor share has been around 52%. 
18 The business sector data stop in 1998. Evidence from individual countries for which data have been continuously 
available shows little change in the labor share since 1998 (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003, p. 903). 
19 Jones and Williams (2000), p.73, Table 1. 
20 Mehra and Prescott (1985) report that the average real return on the stock market for the previous century was of 
0.07. Jones and Williams (2000, p.73, Table 1) consider interest rates ranging from 0.04 to 0.14, representing one-
half and twice the value of 0.07. When ρ  takes on values around this range the behavior of Yg , as a function of α , 
does not change qualitatively. 
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when PMC  is measured by the capital share in income.21 This is the same result recently 
obtained by Aghion et al. (2005) in a vertical differentiation setting. But, unlike that paper 
(where the escape competition and Schumpeterian effects play a major role), we can explain the 
inverted-U relationship between competition and growth in terms of the interaction between the 
profit incentive and resource allocation effects highlighted above.  
Suppose, as in our model, that labor is directly employed in each economic activity. At low 
initial levels of α , an increase of competition, by lowering the price of capital goods for given 
marginal cost, reduces the share of labor devoted to final output manufacturing, Ys  (equation 
15’) and the resources released by this sector can be allocated both to the production of durables 
( js ) and research  ( Ns ) – see equations 16’ and 14’.  
In Figure 1 we see that for values of α  lower than a threshold level, this positive resource 
allocation effect outweighs the profit incentive effect (the negative effect of more competition on 
innovation) and the relationship between PMC and growth may be positive. At higher levels of 
α , instead, a further increase of PMC reduces the share of labor devoted to final output 
manufacturing ( Ys ) and to research ( Ns ), while continuing to increase js . In other words, with 
α  large enough, additional increases of competition imply more capital goods production and a 
higher labor demand coming from the intermediate sector.22 However, unlike what happens for 
low levels of α , now the supplementary resources requested for the production of durables are 
drawn not only from the downstream sector, but also from research ( Ns  is lower). In Figure 1 it 
is clear that for values of α  greater than a given threshold level, PMC and growth are negatively 
correlated, meaning that in this interval both the profit incentive effect and the resource 
allocation effect are negative and reinforce each other.  
 
                                                 
21 The function Yg (α ) maintains the same graphical behavior even if we restrict our attention to values of α  
strictly between 0.264 and 0.425. These two values are obtained by considering the lowest and the highest labor 
share in Table 1 (respectively, 57.5% for Japan in 1970 and 73.6% for Sweden in 1980) and computing (1-73.6%) as 
the lower-bound and (1-57.5%) as the upper-bound limits of α . Note that a value of α 3/1≅  (generally employed 
in empirical and theoretical analyses on growth) is exactly in between 0.264 and 0.425.   
22 Recall that durables are produced one-to-one with labor. 
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CASE 2: 
α
η
α
1
1
10 <<
+
< ,  1≠η . 
We now consider the (more general) case of 
α
η
α
1
1
10 <<
+
< , with 1≠η  and focus on it as a 
proxy of PMC. In plotting equation (18) against η , first of all we have to determine its range of 
variation. Observe that in the case we are considering such a range depends on α . To the best of 
our knowledge, there are no empirical estimates of the elasticity of substitution between 
intermediate goods in Dixit-Stiglitz technologies. Accordingly, we proceed as follows. Firstly, 
we fix the labor share ( α−≡1ShL ) to 0.64 (see Jones and Williams, 2000, p. 73, Table 1). This 
value is close to the average of the labor shares in 1990 for the 12 countries considered in table 1. 
Next, we know from the empirical industry-level estimates by Norrbin (1993) and Basu (1996) 
that the markup -- )1(/1 ShLm −≡ η  in our case -- is approximately between 1.05 and 1.4. Thus, 
with a labor share of 0.64, this suggests focusing on an interval of η  ranging between 1.98 and 
2.65. Note that when the markup is constrained to be between 1.05 and 1.4, the restriction 
αηα /1)1/(10 <<+<  is still checked. The results are in Figure 2. In drawing Figure 2 we 
continue to use the parameter values: k=1, n=0.0144 and ρ =0.07:         
 
          Yg  
2.35 2.4 2.45 2.5 2.55 2.6 2.65
0.0136
0.0138
0.0142
0.0144
PMC (η ) 
FIGURE 2:  The relationship between product market competition (η ) and growth ( Yg ) under 
constrained markups (1.05<m<1.4)  
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Observe that Figure 2 presents a minimum. This result crucially depends on the magnitude of 
the labor share (1-α ). In general, the larger is the labor share, the more likely is the existence of 
the minimum between the corresponding range of η . Even when we use a labor share of 0.52 
(i.e. a share that excludes the self-employed workers - see Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa, 2005), 
we continue to find a minimum in the range αηα /1)1/(10 <<+< .  
Again, the resource allocation and profit incentive effects can be used to explain the intuition 
behind the shape of the relationship between competition (η ) and growth ( Yg ) in Figure 2. In a 
symmetric BGP equilibrium the level of output is equal to: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ttjYt LNssY ηηααα −−= 11 . 
This means that, for given Ys  (independent of η ) and tL  (that evolves exogenously over time), 
the contribution to aggregate output (Y ) following a change of η  can come from variations in js  
and N . According to the profit-incentive-effect, a higher elasticity of substitution (a higher η , 
for given α ) reduces the monopoly power of intermediate producers and, thus, their profits. This 
implies that now innovation pays less (ceteris paribus, the market value of a single idea 
decreases, see equation 8), which leads to a lower firms’ incentive to innovate (a lower N) and, in 
turn, to lower economic growth (Y decreases). Therefore, the profit incentive effect predicts an 
unambiguously negative relationship between PMC (η ) and growth. At the same time, however, 
and according to the resource allocation effect, a higher elasticity of substitution (a higher η , for 
given α ), by increasing the degree of PMC in the intermediate sector leads the representative 
firm of this industry to produce more output at a lower gross markup. Hence, the demand for 
labor coming from the intermediate sector ( js ) rises and so does economic growth, too (Y 
increases). Hence, the resource allocation effect points to a positive relationship between PMC 
(η ) and growth. Having this in mind, Figure 2 suggests that the negative effect of an increase of 
competition on growth (the profit incentive effect) prevails over the positive one (the resource 
allocation effect) at low levels of competition, whereas the inverse is true for a sufficiently higher 
degree of competition (in this case it is the resource allocation effect to outweigh the profit 
incentive effect). This might help explaining the U-shaped relationship between PMC and 
aggregate economic growth when competition is measured by the parameter of substitutability 
between intermediate inputs. 
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5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper we analyzed the relationship between competition and growth in a model of ever-
expanding product varieties without scale effects. More specifically, we purged the scale effect 
by means of the so-called dilution hypothesis and focused on two alternative measures of PMC 
(namely the factor input income shares, on the one hand, and the parameter determining the 
elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs, on the other). 
We found that it is possible to restore a inverse U-shaped relationship between competition 
and growth in the baseline Romer’s (1990) model simply by introducing the assumption that a 
fixed-supply input is used in each economic sector. However, as soon as we allow for the 
parameter determining the elasticity of substitution between intermediate products to be different 
from one (so moving to the diverse proxy of PMC proposed by Jones and Williams, 2000), we 
find that the relationship between competition and growth overturns. 
Clearly, more work is needed to resolve the theoretical ambiguities concerning the effect of 
PMC  on economic growth and to come to more definitive conclusions on this topic. 
Accordingly, for future research it would be interesting to study how results might change in the 
presence of alternative ways of cleaning the scale effect prediction from the model, as well as 
they might depend on the distance of a country from the technological frontier, the availability of 
human capital, and other initial conditions. 
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APPENDIX 
 
In this Appendix we derive the set of results (14) through (19) in the main text. 
In the BGP equilibrium ttY YYg /
•
≡ , ttN NNg /
•
≡  and r are constant. Using equation (8) in the 
main text this implies: 
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From the free-entry condition in the main text (equation 9) we obtain: 
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Equating (3) and (5’) in the main text yields: 
( ) Ytjt sms α
α
−
=
1
, 
whereas, equating (3) and (A2) above one obtains: 
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Since ngr Y −+= ρ  (see equation 10 in the main text) and k
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, Yts  can also be 
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Accordingly, jts  becomes: 
( )[ ]
( )1−
−+
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m
nkss Ntjt
ρ
. 
Using (11) in the main text and the fact that ηα/1≡m  we conclude that: 
( ) ( )( ) NNt snks =+−−−−= 11 2 αηαρηαα . 
Given Ns  we may easily obtain: 
( ) ( )[ ] YYt snks =−+−= ρα 11 ; 
( )[ ] jjt snks =−+= ρηα 12 ; 
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In a symmetric BGP equilibrium, the level of GDP at t is: 
 25
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and its growth rate ( Yg ) is:   
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where n is the exogenous population growth. 
Given Yg , the real interest rate is (equation 10 in the main text): 
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Notice that: 
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With ( )1,0∈α , αη /1< , 0>k  and n>ρ , the sum written above is always positive. This 
ensures that 0>NtP  for each t (see equation A1 above). 
